You might have come across the discussion that following the 27th Amendment, significant interference occurred. The National Finance Commiss...
You might have come across the discussion that following the 27th Amendment, significant interference occurred.
The National Finance Commission (NFC) Allocation is once more in progress.
The NFC, newly established on August 22 with all the ceremony and documentation we have come to anticipate, has yet to hold its first meeting. The November 18 date, similar to our GDP forecasts, has quietly been pushed back to an unspecified time in the future. And talking about downward adjustments, the growth projection has dropped significantly by up to
0.7 percentage points.
For many years, officials from the finance ministry and politicians across all parties, whenever they mysteriously end up in Islamabad, have wished to reduce the provinces' share. It would have already occurred if not for that persistent element called the 18th Amendment, which has a tendency to strengthen the provinces and annoy the central government. Without the concerns surrounding center-province relations, particularly the PPP's consistent support for provincial autonomy, such changes might have taken place earlier.
At the center of the discussion is Article 160(3A), which states that a province's portion "shall not be less than" the amount it received in the prior allocation. This percentage currently amounts to 57.5 percent of the available pool. For the time being, there are few legal options for changing this distribution. The federal government has already excluded the profitable petroleum levy from the divisible pool by classifying it as a 'developmental levy' instead of a tax.
Currently, in theory, the ruling coalition has enough support to push an amendment through Parliament. We have witnessed that constitutional rules often function more as gentle recommendations. When the state needs votes, they seem to materialize out of nowhere. However, the true unpredictable factor here is not the Constitution itself. It is the PPP. Their long-standing commitment to the 18th Amendment and the present NFC Award is significant. Will they compromise? Only if the establishment concludes that compromising is the right thing for the nation.
Most popular discussions regarding the NFC are filled with technical language. Centrists claim that the federation is financially strained due to the significant responsibilities of subsidies, pensions, defense, and debt payments, while receiving only a small portion of the available funds. They argue that provinces spend carelessly, generate no revenue, and treat public funds as if they were a credit card with no limits. Regardless of whether you agree, the main idea is that the NFC is not a charitable program for the provinces. It is a constitutional structure established through political agreement 15 years ago. The provinces did not rob the center in a back alley. Everyone signed the agreement with clear minds.
However, there is another aspect of the NFC that seldom appears in respectful policy discussions, and that is politics. Not politics related to IMF programs or hybrid regimes, but what little is left of genuine democratic politics. Over the past ten years, the federal landscape has turned into a tomb for political power. With military desires and IMF financial data taking precedence, civilian governments at the center have had almost no space to function, let alone make decisions. Achievement is irrelevant; adherence is what counts.
Yet, the provinces still possess some breathing room. This breathing room is financial—NFC currency. It is via provincial budgets that politicians construct roads, enlarge social initiatives, distribute employment opportunities, and strive with the traditional method of securing votes. Reducing the provincial portion will choke the last remnants of party politics. And maybe, for certain individuals, this is exactly the intention.
However, there is another option that might appeal to efficiency-focused centrists while maintaining democratic space: transfer more financial authority to local governments. Ensure they receive a portion, but only if they are genuinely elected. If no such bodies exist, allow the central government to retain that amount from the available funds. This approach would promote a viable third level of governance, enhance the effectiveness of spending, and provide political actors with real motivations to deliver results, rather than merely following orders.
A bold concept, maybe. But then again, in a nation where decimal points can ignite political conflict, perhaps boldness is precisely what we require.
Provided by SyndiGate Media Inc. (Syndigate.info).
